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Judicial Dismissal in the Interest of Justice 
 
Valena E. Beety* 
 
ABSTRACT 
Of the 1.6 million Americans in prison, most inmates are serving sen-
tences for non-violent offenses.  Who is responsible?  Hyper-incarceration is 
not simply due to outdated drug laws or stringent sentencing.  Courts in the 
last thirty years have taken a lackadaisical back seat.  Prosecutors are failing 
in their gate-keeping function nationally.  Most simple arrests are prosecuted 
without even evaluating the substance of the case.  Police stops can snowball 
into convictions through our plea system.  In short, the criminal justice sys-
tem provides no systemic accountability for its own results. 
This Article focuses on this lack of accountability and proposes a con-
ceptual shift, as well as a practical solution: pivoting accountability to the 
courts.  Twelve states recognize the capacity of judges to dismiss cases in the 
interest of justice.  Dismissal in the interest of justice allows a court to dis-
miss a procedurally proper, but unjust or unjustifiable, cause of action.  
Thus, dismissing cases in the interest of justice can provide a check where 
few exist for overzealous prosecutions, race-based patrolling, and overuse of 
“three strikes” laws.  In addition, dismissals can require more consistency 
and reliability in evidence and in state prosecutions, whether on the misde-
meanor or felony level.  And ultimately all states can create this capacity 
through state laws and state rules of criminal procedure. 
Transforming our prison paradigm moves beyond shifting individual 
laws; court-initiated dismissals can address the underlying problem of ac-
countability.  By finding a practical application already in use by some 
states, this Article creates a useful framework for both ends of the spectrum: 
conceptually reforming our system while practically assisting individual cas-
es and lives. 
 
* Associate Professor, West Virginia University College of Law.  Many thanks for the 
valuable opportunities to present this paper and receive feedback: University of Texas 
School of Law through the Big XII Scholar Program, the University of Virginia 
School of Law Neighborhood Roundtable, and the University of Minnesota Law 
School through the Robina Institute of Criminal Law & Criminal Justice.  In particu-
lar, special thanks go to Jordan Steiker, Carol Steiker, Jennifer Laurin, Darryl Brown, 
Brandon Garrett, Jenny Roberts, Corinna Lain and Josephine Ross for their thoughtful 
review and suggestions.  My appreciation finally goes to Jared Dotson and Greg Sie-
pel for their excellent research assistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
“I have always found that mercy bears richer fruits than strict justice.”1 
– President Abraham Lincoln 
 
Crack cocaine offenders are getting a second chance.  On January 30, 
2014, the Obama Administration called on defense attorneys to locate in-
mates who had been harshly sentenced under drug laws and to encourage 
them to apply for clemency.2  One month prior, President Obama granted 
clemency to eight federal inmates sentenced under the old crack-cocaine law.  
He commuted their sentences saying, 
Because of a disparity in the law that is now recognized as unjust, they 
remain in prison, separated from their families and their communities, 
at a cost of millions of taxpayer dollars each year. . . .  Commuting the 
sentences of these eight Americans is an important step toward restor-
ing fundamental ideals of justice and fairness.3 
These steps toward “restoring . . . justice and fairness” signal a changing 
response to American drug crime prosecution and hyper-incarceration.  They 
indicate a return to the natural rights and principles of the Constitution to be 
executed by multiple branches of government.4 
In the judicial branch, some state courts have the power to dismiss cases 
sua sponte.  Acting “in the furtherance of justice,” these courts can consider 
context, as well as the just or unjust application of laws.  Where this respon-
sibility has traditionally lain with prosecutors, this Article advocates a shift of 
accountability to the courts.  Courts may dismiss cases that should never have 
been filed “in the interest of justice.” 
Accountability lies at the heart of the criminal justice system.  In the 
face of hyper-incarceration, this Article seeks to address this underlying lack 
 
          1. Erika Andersen, Abraham Lincoln: 10 Quotes To Help You Lead Today, 
FORBES (Dec. 17, 2012, 12:35 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikaandersen/
2012/12/17/abraham-lincoln-10-quotes-to-help-you-lead-today/. 
 2. Matt Apuzzo, Justice Dept. Starts Quest for Inmates to Be Freed, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/us/politics/white-house-
seeks-drug-clemency-candidates.html?emc=eta1&_r=0. 
 3. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by 
the President on Clemency (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/12/19/statement-president-clemency. 
 4. As President Abraham Lincoln put it, “The legitimate object of government, 
is to do for a community of people, whatever they need to have done, but can not [sic] 
do, at all, or can not [sic], so well do, for themselves – in their separate, and individu-
al capacities.”  ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Fragment on Government, in THE LANGUAGE OF 
LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL SPEECHES AND WRITINGS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 140 (Jo-
seph R. Fornieri, ed., Regnery Publishing 2009) (1854).  See also Jason A. Adkins, 
Lincoln’s Constitution Revisited, 36 N. KY. L. REV. 211, 213 (2009). 
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of accountability and shift the system.  Rather than piecemeal reform through 
individual laws, this systemic shift can alter public conceptualization of the 
criminal justice system and reinstate public trust. 
And yet this Article is more than a concept; it is a practical application 
that some states are already implementing.  Courts can apply this conceptual-
ly radical shift rather simply – as a small act of reprieve for misdemeanor 
convictions.  This Article thus creates a useful framework for both ends of the 
spectrum: conceptually reforming our system while practically assisting indi-
vidual cases and lives. 
Courts, in the thirty years since the rise of hyper-incarceration, have 
largely been constrained as onlookers.  Prosecutors control charging and plea 
offers.  The final criminal and civil punishment is often accepted as a result of 
no one individual action – rather just the system in motion.  Shifting account-
ability to the court may ensure justice and true service of the community by a 
criminal prosecution. 
Twelve states permit trial courts to dismiss counts – either misdemeanor 
or felony – on their own accord.  Eight of these states do so through statute, 
four through state rules of criminal procedure.  For those state courts that do 
not currently have the capacity to sua sponte dismiss cases in the interest of 
justice, the further promulgation of state rules of criminal procedure can cre-
ate this power for courts in support of judicial authority. 
In the face of predominant prosecutorial power, court discretion can bal-
ance a system that indiscriminately undermines the future life choices of non-
violent offenders through a simple arrest.  Part I of this Article provides 
background on the current state of the criminal justice system.  This Part dis-
cusses the War on Drugs, prison expansion, and heightened prosecutions, 
along with the elimination of parole and decreased judicial discretion.  Part I 
also addresses civil punishments for criminal convictions and the burden of 
these punishments on other members of society.  In brief, these punishments 
result in temporary or permanent exile.   
Part II proposes a framework of judicial accountability and a shift away 
from the current justice model, specifically reclaiming the power of courts to 
dismiss cases – on their own initiative or that of defense counsel – in the in-
terest of justice.  This pivot away from prosecutors can provide greater trans-
parency; shifting the responsibility may remedy how off-course our system 
has travelled. 
Part III discusses the conceptual and ethical quandaries of judges facing 
unethical laws or punishments.  These judges are charged with the responsi-
bility of either upholding such laws and punishments or following internal or 
social morals and ethics.  Part III examines the ultimate purpose of the Arti-
cle’s proposed shift in accountability, as well as potential drawbacks.  This 
Part responds to those challenges using a philosophical analysis of the role of 
judges in criminal proceedings. 
Part IV, in contrast, provides the most practical usage of dismissal in the 
interest of justice: three strikes laws.  This Part discusses current dismissals 
and how this power can most practically be exercised.  Part IV elaborates on 
4
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the usefulness of dismissal in the interest of justice in response to mandatory 
minimum sentences, focusing specifically on its relationship with three 
strikes laws.   
Part V continues the application with the real usage of dismissal, pre-
dominantly in misdemeanor cases, offering a conceptual comparison to de 
minimis infractions.  This Part also briefly explains the importance of misde-
meanor dismissals, even though misdemeanors are often construed as insig-
nificant, minor convictions.   
Finally, Part VI details how differing state laws provide the avenue for 
courts to dismiss actions and compares the approaches implemented by dif-
ferent states.  Part VI concludes by proposing that states consider creating a 
relevant rule of criminal procedure, promulgated by the state supreme court in 
most jurisdictions. 
This Article considers how courts can rehabilitate our criminal justice 
system by reclaiming their own authority and dismissing cases in the interest 
of justice.  By creating this capacity for courts, either through legislation or 
through state rules of criminal procedure, society can prevent criminal prose-
cutions that are against the interests of justice. 
I.  THE CURRENT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE WAR ON DRUGS, 
PRISON EXPANSION, ELIMINATION OF PAROLE, AND THE DECREASE 
IN JUDICIAL DISCRETION 
In his seminal book, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Erving 
Goffman posits that artificial, willed credulity happens on every level of so-
cial organization – an attempt to ignore any reality that may disrupt the social 
structure.5  A woman trips and others look away, pretending that she did not 
fall.  Until recently, increased policing and heightened sentencing served a 
similar purpose: to maintain a fiction that truly dangerous people in society 
can be identified, punished, and separated from the rest of society, primarily 
by prosecutors.  The reality of hyper-incarceration and the disproportional 
application of drug laws to poor people of color began the shift away from 
containment policy, and instead, toward reinstating judicial discretion and 
solutions to rein in a problem that has become too large to ignore. 
A.  The Growth of Prisons and a Rise in the Incarceration Rate 
In the words of Angela Davis, the 1980s prison ideologically became 
“an abstract site into which undesirables are deposited,”6 an othering that 
separates the felon from society, both morally and socially.  Incapacitation 
 
 5. ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 167–68 
(1959). 
 6. ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 16 (2003). 
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influenced the growth and functioning of prisons at that time.7  Incapacitation 
rose in popularity because the prevailing reasons of punishment – rehabilita-
tion and deterrence – appeared to be failing.8  Indeed, shortly before prisons 
began expanding, there was a widespread belief that prisons might be abol-
ished altogether as a failed project.9  Even the descriptive language changed: 
from “correctional institutions” and “reformatories” grew “detention centers” 
and “maximum security.”10 
The real world consequences of this abstract creation have been cata-
strophic.  Criminal and civil punishments have ballooned in the past thirty 
years; our criminal justice system expanded and transformed across all 
branches of government.11  When our government and society accepted inca-
pacitation to justify imprisonment, we adopted an expansionist vision of pris-
on rather than the minimalist “worst of the worst” approach.12  The number of 
inmates grew from 241,000 in 1975 to 1.6 million at the time of this Article;13 
parole diminished or disappeared completely; sentences for crimes became 
mandatory and harsher, particularly for non-violent drug offenses; and over 
this thirty-year time period, individuals with drug convictions slowly lost 
their rights as citizens – long after their “punishments” and criminal sentences 
ended.14 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines of 1984 mandated fixed sentencing 
ranges for most federal crimes, leaving courts with little discretion.15  With 
 
 7. FRANKLIN E. ZIMMING & GORDON HAWKINS, INCAPACITATION: PENAL 
CONFINEMENT AND THE RESTRAINT OF CRIME 3 (reprt. 1997). 
 8. Id. at 8–9; see also FRANCIS ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE 
IDEAL: PENAL POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 33–34, 57–58 (1979) (“[T]he rehabilita-
tive ideal constitutes a threat to the political values of free societies. . . .  
[R]ehabilitative objectives are largely unattainable and that rehabilitative programs 
and research are dubious or misdirected.”). 
 9. In 1973, the National Council on Crime and Delinquency had asserted “only 
a small percentage of offenders in penal institutions today” required incarceration.  
ZIMMING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 12. 
 10. Id. at 12–13.  Interestingly, President Obama’s Chief of the Office of Nation-
al Drug Control Policy, Gil Kerlikowske, also suggested a change in language: a shift 
away from war rhetoric used to discuss national drug problems, drug problems that 
should be equally thought of as a public health issue.  See Douglas A. Berman, Turn-
ing Hope-And-Change Talk into Clemency Action for Nonviolent Drug Offenders, 36 
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 59, 63 (2010) (citing Gary Fields, White 
House Czar Call for End to ‘War on Drugs,’ WALL ST. J., at A 3 (May 14, 2009)).  In 
her words, “We’re not at war with people in this country.”  Id. 
 11. This gives hope that a move toward clemency could also occur across the 
branches. 
 12. ZIMMING & HAWKINS, supra note 7, at 11. 
 13. Suzanne M. Kirchhoff, Cong. Research Serv., R41177, Economic Impacts of 
Prison Growth, 7–9 (Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41177.pdf. 
 14. Id. at 9–10. 
 15. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–3586 (2012); 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 991–998 (2012). 
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the adoption of the Sentencing Guidelines came the elimination of the Parole 
Commission, a major form of executive post-conviction review and adjust-
ment.16  Prior to the implementation of the Sentencing Guidelines, the U.S. 
Parole Commission in the executive branch reviewed all sentences.17  In tan-
dem with this significant loss of executive review, executive pardons likewise 
decreased.18 
In 1986, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which codified 
harsh punishments for drug crimes, in response to the “crack epidemic.”19  
The intervening decades clarified the true distinctions between how crack was 
portrayed and its actual impact.20  Courts now acknowledge that there is no 
true chemical distinction between crack cocaine and powder cocaine, despite 
the 100 to 1 sentencing ratio for the two drugs that was established by the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act.21  Scientific studies now reveal that there is no verifia-
ble connection between maternal cocaine use during pregnancy and severe 
harm to the child in utero.22  The alleged problem of “crack babies,”23 which 
 
 16. Charles Shanor & Marc Miller, Pardon Us: Systematic Presidential Pardons 
7 (2001), http://ssrn.com/abstract=269343.  The U.S. Parole Commission still exists 
thanks to multiple U.S. Parole Commission Extension Acts; however, their review is 
limited to persons who committed a federal offense before November 1, 1987; per-
sons who committed a D.C. Code offense before August 5, 2000; persons who com-
mitted a Uniform Code of Military Justice offense and are parole-eligible; and per-
sons who are serving prison terms imposed by foreign countries and have been trans-
ferred to the United States to serve their sentence.  See Peter B. Hoffman, History of 
the Federal Parole System, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 2–3 (May 2009), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/uspc/legacy/2009/10/07/history.pdf. 
 17. Shanor & Miller, supra note 16. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Gerald M. Boyd, Reagan Signs Anti-Drug Measure; Hopes for ‘Drug-Free 
Generation’, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 1986), http://www.nytimes.com/1986/
10/28/us/reagan-signs-anti-drug-measure-hopes-for-drug-gree-generation.html. 
 20. See also Susan Okie, The Epidemic That Wasn’t, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2009) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/health/27coca.html?pagewanted=all. 
 21. Indeed, one state supreme court struck down a state statute mandating a 
heightened punishment for crack cocaine versus powder cocaine on an equal protec-
tion basis because the statute had a discriminatory impact on African Americans 
without any rational basis for the heightened punishment.  State v. Russell, 477 
N.W.2d 886, 887 (Minn. 1991). 
 22. Deborah A. Frank et al., Growth, Development, and Behavior in Early 
Childhood Following Prenatal Cocaine Exposure, 285 JAMA 1613, 1626 (2001).  
The harm of cocaine to a fetus is comparable to smoking tobacco while pregnant.  See 
id. 
 23. Today, poor women of color are still prosecuted for murder for imbibing 
cocaine while pregnant and suffering a miscarriage or stillbirth.  See, e.g., State of 
Mississippi v. Gibbs, No. 2007-0031-CRI (Cir. Ct. of Lowndes Cnty. 2014) (Ms. 
Gibbs was charged with depraved heart murder, which carries a mandatory life sen-
tence, but her case was dismissed in 2014), http://www.cdispatch.com/files/
30s60432014120102PM.pdf.  See also Ed Pilkington, Outcry in America as Pregnant 
Women Who Lose Babies Face Murder Charges, THE GUARDIAN (June 24, 2011), 
7
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even led to the recommended sterilization of some female cocaine users,24 
was based on junk science.25 
Following Reagan’s Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, President Clinton 
signed into law his own major crime bill in 1994.26  The Violent Crime Con-
trol and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 granted $30 billion to “crime control” 
and further enforced minimum sentencing.27  Mandatory minimum sentenc-
ing was, and continues to be, particularly vindictive toward drug offenders.  
The most well known mandatory minimum sentencing laws are the “three 
strike laws.”28  First adopted in California in 1994, these laws have proliferat-
ed across the states, requiring long minimum terms, or even life sentences, 
when an offender is convicted of a third felony.29  The shift in sentencing was 
even noted by former Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who stated that 
“[m]andatory minimums . . . are frequently the result of floor amendments to 
demonstrate emphatically that legislators want to . . . get tough on crime.”30 
 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/24/america-pregnant-women-murder-
charges.  National Advocates for Pregnant Women has advocated for women charged 
with felony crimes for having controlled substances in their system when giving birth, 
a charge that could lead to the twisted outcomes of pregnant women not going to 
doctors for check-ups and not giving birth in a hospital.  See Punishment of Pregnant 
Women, NAT’L ADVOCATES FOR PREGNANT WOMEN, http://www.advocatesfor
pregnantwomen.org/issues/punishment_of_pregnant_women/ (last visited June 26, 
2015). 
 24. Frank et al., supra note 22, at 1626 (describing C.R.A.C.K. (Children Re-
quiring a Caring Kommunity) as “a controversial charity that raises money to give 
mothers with a history of illegal drug use financial incentives to accept long-acting 
contraception, or, in most cases, sterilization”). 
 25. Lynn Paltrow & Kathrine Jack, Pregnant Women, Junk Science, and Zealous 
Defense, THE CHAMPION (May 2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/child_law/ParentRep/PregnantWomenJunkScienceZealousDefense.
authcheckdam.pdf. 
 26. President Clinton’s Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 
1994 (Crime Act), was signed into law on September 13, 1994.  Pub. L. No. 103-322, 
108 Stat. 1796 (1994).  This “sweeping law addresses assault weapon possession, 
prison funding, community policing, police recruitment and training, ‘justice grants,’ 
violence against women and the elderly, sex crimes, terrorism, the federal death pen-
alty (which it applied to numerous new offenses), drug control, youth violence, crimi-
nal street gangs, child pornography, victims’ rights, and [hate crimes].”  Scott Steiner, 
Habitations of Cruelty: The Pitfalls of Expanding Hate Crime Legislation to Include 
the Homeless, 45 No. 5 CRIM. LAW BULLETIN ART. 4 (Fall 2009). 
 27. See Crime Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796. 
 28. Charles Doyle, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32040, FEDERAL MANDATORY 
MINIMUM SENTENCING STATUTES, i (2013). 
 29. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 667, 1170.12 (1999 & Supp. 2000); 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-29-147 (2015). 
 30. Hon. William H. Rehnquist, Luncheon Address, in U.S. SENTENCING 
COMM’N, DRUGS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 283, 287 (1993).  Lawmakers them-
selves have referred to themselves glowingly as “tough on crime.”  See Rachel E. 
8
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Furthering the trend of legislators getting “tough on crime,” in 1996 the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) severely limited 
access to federal courts for post-conviction relief.31  AEDPA created a one-
year statute of limitations on first time petitioners in federal court, with no 
exception for claims of innocence.32 
While sentences grew longer and harsher, the industry for private pris-
ons also grew.33  The Sentencing Reform Act and federal legislation on man-
datory minimum sentencing, passed in 1986, 1988, and 1990, led the federal 
inmate population to double between 1980 and 1989 and to double again by 
1999.34  As of the time of this Article, the federal prison population has in-
creased 790% since 1980.35  The number of private prisons36 grew to meet 
the demand of both state and federal criminal systems.  Prisons soon faced 
problems of inadequate health care for inmates,37 sexual violence,38 and over-
crowding, to name but a few.  In 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litiga-
tion Reform Act (“PLRA”) limiting access to federal courts for inmates and 
their complaints.39 
 
Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Adminis-
trative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 873 n.14 (2009) (quoting federal lawmakers). 
 31. Kathleen Ridolfi & Seth Gordon, Gubernatorial Clemency Powers: Justice 
or Mercy?, 24 CRIM. JUST. 26 (2009). 
 32. Id.  Thus, AEDPA has undermined and refused constitutional claims before 
they can be heard in federal court.  See id. 
 33. Historical Information: A Storied Past, BUREAU OF PRISONS, 
http://www.bop.gov/about/history/ (last visited June 29, 2015). 
 34. Id. 
 35. Nicole Flatow, Federal Prison Population Spiked 790 Percent Since 1980, 
THINKPROGRESS (Feb. 7. 2013), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2013/02/07/1552751/
federal-prison-population-spiked-790-percent-since-1980/?mobile=nc. 
 36. The primary concern of private prisons is profit; in 2011 Corrections Corpo-
ration of America recorded revenue of $1.7 billion for 2011, and The Geo Group, 
Inc., recorded revenue of $1.6 billion for 2011.  Suevon Lee, By the Numbers: The 
U.S.’s Growing For-Profit Detention Industry, PROPUBLICA (June 20, 2012), 
http://propublica.org/article/by-the-numbers-the-u.s.s-growing-for-profit-detention-
industry. 
 37. See Wil S. Hylton, Sick on the Inside: Correctional HMOs and the Coming 
Prison Plague, HARPER’S MAG. (Aug. 2003), http://harpers.org/archive/2003/08/sick-
on-the-inside/; Editorial, Death Behind Bars, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/10/opinion/death-behind-bars.html?_r=0; Opinion, 
Brent Staples, Treat the Epidemic Behind Bars Before it Hits the Streets, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 22, 2004. 
 38. See, e.g., WILBERT RIDEAU & RON WIKBERG, LIFE SENTENCES: RAGE AND 
SURVIVAL BEHIND BARS, 73–89 (1992); Adam Liptak, Ex-Inmate’s Suit Offers View 
Into Sexual Slavery in Prisons, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2004, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/16/national/16rape.html. 
 39. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e (West 2013). 
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The harms to inmates affect more than just the men and women incar-
cerated.  Inmates’ children and spouses are also stigmatized40 and are often 
left without financial support.  Family members are separated from their 
loved ones by distance to the prison, and time, until the end of the sentence – 
a sentence carried out not only by the inmate.41 
Currently, 1.6 million people are incarcerated in the United States; the 
majority of these inmates were convicted of non-violent crimes.42  The cost of 
incarcerating one percent of the American adult population is $68 billion 
annually at local, state, and federal corrections facilities.43  This cost has con-
tributed to state and federal budget deficits during our economic recession.44 
B.  The Social Impact of the Government’s Containment Approach to 
the Criminal Justice System 
In 1960, Chief Justice Earl Warren observed that “[c]onviction of a fel-
ony imposes a status upon a person which not only makes him vulnerable to 
future sanctions through new civil disability statutes, but which also seriously 
affects his reputation and economic opportunities.”45  Fifty years later, his 
observation has only become more accurate. 
State and federal legislatures have created collateral penalties to incar-
ceration – penalties that diminish a person’s full citizenship rights in society.  
Previously, courts determined the ultimate sentence for criminal offenses.  
Now, above and beyond mandatory minimum sentence requirements, legisla-
tures create new administrative punishments, simultaneously restricting the 
flexibility of courts.  The collateral civil penalties of a criminal conviction 
follow the individual long after the prison sentence has ended.46  For instance, 
 
 40. John Hagan & Ronit Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment 
for Children, Communities, and Prisoners, 26 PRISONS 121 (1999); JEREMY TRAVIS, 
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 
15–36 (2002). 
 41. See, e.g., TERRY A. KUPERS, THE TRAUMA OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TORTURE 127 
(2008); FAMM’s History, FAMILIES AGAINST MANDATORY MINIMUMS, 
http://famm.org/about/famms-history/ (last visited June 29, 2015). 
 42. E. Ann Carson & William J. Sabol, Prisoners in 2011, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf.  This num-
ber is for inmates in state and federal prisons; when including jails, the number rises 
to 2.3 million people.  Id. 
 43. Rebecca Ruiz, Eyes on the Prize, THE AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 6, 2010), 
http://prospect.org/article/eyes-prize. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 593–94 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). 
 46. Collateral consequences have been inventoried in a variety of states and at 
the federal level.  The ABA has created the National Inventory of the Collateral Con-
sequences of Conviction, which currently has information on all 50 states.  National 
Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, ABA, http://www.
abacollateralconsequences.org/ (last visited June 30, 2015).  See also Community Re-
Entry Program, Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia, Collateral 
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a minor drug conviction now makes an individual ineligible for welfare bene-
fits, public housing, a driver’s license, student loans, insurance, voting, gov-
ernment employment, and many jobs that require a professional license.47  
These civil punishments have a dramatic influence on the well-being of peo-
ple with convictions and their families.  A court does not control or dictate 
the implementation of these penalties.  The National Employment Law Pro-
ject estimates that 65 million Americans have a criminal record,48 while the 
Department of Justice puts that estimate at 92 million Americans.49 
With these obstacles, many people leaving prison are unable to obtain 
employment.  As a result, they may re-offend and return to prison.50  Prison 
time is only part of the problem; the prison label is what supports the system 
of creating an “undercaste” of individuals in our society.51  Recognizing the 
multiple punishments that cannot be controlled by a court further emphasizes 
the importance of dismissal in the interest of justice and diverting cases be-
fore the punishment phase. 
 
Consequences of Criminal Convictions in the District of Columbia: a Guide for Crim-
inal Defense Lawyers, REENTRY NET (June 6, 2010), http://www.reentry.net/
library/item.121665-Collateral_Consequences_of_Criminal_Convictions_in_the_
District_of_Columbia; Re-Entry of Ex-Offenders Clinic, University of Maryland 
School of Law, A Report on Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions in 
Maryland, SENTENCING PROJECT (Spring 2007), http://www.sentencingproject.org/
doc/publications/cc_report2007.pdf; Kelly Poff Salzman et al., ABA Commission on 
Effective Criminal Sanctions, Internal Exile: Collateral Consequences of Conviction 
in Federal Laws and Regulations, ABA (January 2009), http://www.abanet.org/cecs/
internalexile.pdf; Molly Kovel, The Consequences of Criminal Proceedings in New 
York State, THE BRONX DEFENDERS (2015), http://www.reentry.net/ny/
search/item.76898; Kimberly R. Mossoney & Cara A. Roecker, Ohio Collateral Con-
sequences Project: Executive Summary, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 611 (2005). 
 47. Margaret Colgate Love, The Collateral Consequences of Padilla v. Ken-
tucky: Is Forgiveness Now Constitutionally Required?, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 113, 116 (2011).  The majority of people convicted of drug crimes are 
individuals living in poverty; however, this may simply be because drug use by upper 
and middle class citizens is not detected, recorded, or punished.  See Sean Estaban 
McCabe et al., Race/Ethnicity and Gender Differences in Drug Use and Abuse Among 
College Students, 60 J. OF ETHNICITY IN SUBSTANCE ABUSE 75–95 (2008). 
 48. See Michelle Natividad Rodriguez & Maurice Emsellem, 65 Million “Need 
Not Apply:” The Case for Reforming Criminal Background Checks for Employment, 
THE NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT 1, 13–18 (2011), 
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/65_Million_Need_Not_Apply.pdf. 
 49. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, more than 92 million individu-
als were in the files of the state criminal history repositories on December 31, 2008 
(though an individual may have records in more than one state).  Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, Survey of State Criminal History Systems, U.S. DEP’T JUST. 2, 12, tbl. 1 
(2009), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/228661.pdf. 
 50. See ZIMMING & HAWKINS, supra note 7. 
 51. “Undercaste” is a term used in MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: 
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 94 (2012). 
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II.  JUDICIAL CLEMENCY: DISMISSING CASES IN THE INTEREST OF 
JUSTICE 
Public officials are cautiously moving away from retributive punish-
ments because harsh sentences have not made communities safer,  and the 
retributive system costs taxpayers billions of dollars each year.52  The politi-
cal ramifications of a more merciful approach may not be as detrimental as 
the hyperbole. 
Yet this move has been years in the making.  On January 15, 2001, 
shortly before leaving office, President Clinton delivered this message to 
Congress, despite his historically “hard on crime” presidency: “We must re-
examine our national sentencing policies, focusing particularly on mandatory 
minimum sentences for non-violent offenders.”53  Since the 1990s, federal 
judges have expressed their discontent with mandatory minimum sentences54 
and have called for a change to the sentencing structure.55  Justice Anthony 
Kennedy referred to mandatory minimum sentencing as “misguided” in that it 
“gives the decision to an assistant prosecutor not trained in the exercise of 
discretion and takes discretion from the trial judge. . . .  Most of the sentenc-
ing discretion should be with the judge, not the prosecutors.”56 
Today, it is vital but no longer sufficient for judges to follow the appro-
priate procedures for applying these laws and punishments.  The Supreme 
Court once held, “Process is not an end in itself.  Its constitutional purpose is 
 
 52. Suevon Lee, By the Numbers: The U.S.’s Growing For-Profit Detention 
Industry, PROPUBLICA (June 20, 2012), http://www.propublica.org/article/by-the-
numbers-the-u.s.s-growing-for-profit-detention-industry. 
 53. President William J. Clinton, Message to Congress: The Unfinished Work of 
Building One America (Jan. 15, 2001).  President Clinton went on to advocate for a 
10-to-1 ratio between crack and powder cocaine sentencing policies, rather than a 
100-to-1 ratio.  See id.  In signing the bill in 1995, President Clinton rejected the Sen-
tencing Commission’s recommendations for reform and instead maintained the 100-
to-1 ratio.  See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 
60 Fed. Reg. 25,074 (proposed May 10, 1995), rejected by Congress in Act of Oct. 
30, 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-38, 109 Stat. 334 (1995), and signed into law by President 
Clinton. 
 54. See Hon. James G. Carr, Sentencing Reform and Pretrial Release, 5 FED. 
SENT. R. 220, 221 (1993) (calling on the Clinton Administration to reduce mandatory 
minimum sentences and noting, “The prosecutor’s choice of charges has always in-
fluenced ultimate punishment.  But before the guidelines, the authority to select 
charges was offset by the district judge’s unrestrained power to impose a sentence he 
or she thought most suitable.  That counterweight to prosecutorial discretion has been 
dramatically reduced as a result of federal sentencing reforms.”). 
 55. The most outspoken federal judge has been federal district court judge Paul 
Cassell of Utah.  See Tony Mauro, Federal Judge Speaks Out Against Mandatory 
Minimum Sentencing, NAT’L L. J. (June 27, 2007). 




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 80, Iss. 3 [2015], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss3/5
2015] JUDICIAL DISMISSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE 641 
to protect a substantive interest to which the individual has a legitimate claim 
of entitlement.”57  Dismissal by a court in the interest of justice is created to 
address precisely these trappings of empty process. 
A.  Dismissal in the Interest of Justice and the Courts’ Burgeoning 
Capacity 
Dismissal in the interest of justice allows a court to dismiss a procedur-
ally proper, yet unjust, cause of action.58  At common law, courts could dis-
miss a criminal proceeding only for a legal or procedural defect.59  The power 
to dismiss a case, instead, rested with the prosecutor by virtue of nolle prose-
qui60 “to prevent oppression.”61  Indeed, both nolle prosequi and dismissal in 
the interest of justice were used in response to the AIDS epidemic in the 
1990s, where courts dismissed cases against terminally ill defendants.62  
Some scholars and courts have found dismissal in the interest of justice to be 
an extension or evolution of the common law nolle prosequi.63  Other states 
emphasize the inherent power of courts to govern their own courtrooms, in-
cluding the capacity and duty to rule on cases to promote justice.64 
In 1881, the New York state legislature became the first legislative body 
to give state courts the power to dismiss criminal proceedings on their own 
motions.65  Since that time, twelve states and Puerto Rico have provided this 
same capacity to judges: to dismiss cases in the interest of justice.66  As the 
 
 57. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983). 
 58. See John Wirenius, A Model of Discretion: New York’s ‘Interest of Justice’ 
Dismissal Statute, 58 ALB. L. REV. 175, 178–79 (1994). 
 59. See id. 
 60. State v. Echols, 793 P.2d 1066, 1071 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990). 
 61. The literal meaning of nolle prosequi is “I am unwilling to prosecute.”  See 
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1410 (N.D. Cal. 1984).  See Alec 
Samuels, Non-Crown Prosecutions: Prosecutions by Non-Police Agencies and by 
Private Individuals, 1986 CRIM. L. REV. 33, 41 (giving an example of nolle prosequi, 
which is also referred to as “nol pros,” when the accused is terminally ill). 
 62. See Wirenius, supra note 58 at 218. 
 63. See id. at 177. 
 64. See LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17; see also State v. Odom, 993 So.2d 663, 
675 (La. 2008) (“Additionally, the trial court had the inherent authority to fashion a 
remedy to promote justice.”); State v. Mims, 329 So.2d, 686, 688 (La. 1976) (“Where 
the law is silent, it is within the inherent authority of the court to fashion a remedy 
which will promote the orderly and expeditious administration of justice.”). 
 65. See Wirenius, supra note 58 at 178. 
 66. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385 (2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-3504 (2015); 
MINN. STAT. § 631.21 (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-13-401 (2015); OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 22, § 815 (2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.755 (2015); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 43(c); 
IOWA R. CIV. P. 2.33(1); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40 (McKinney 2015); P.R. R. 
CRIM. P. 247(b); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 25; VT. R. CRIM. P. 48(b)(2); WASH. R. CRIM. P. 
8.3.  See also Manning v. Engelkes, 281 N.W.2d 7, 10–11 (Iowa 1979) (collecting 
authority); People v. Panibianci, 510 N.Y.S.2d 801, 802 (Sup. Ct. Monroe Cnty. 
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Court of Appeals of New York eloquently stated, “Throughout this history, 
and no less today, its thrust, even to the disregard of legal or factual merit, 
has been ‘to allow the letter of the law gracefully and charitably to succumb 
to the spirit of justice.’”67 
This judicial power has only been loosely defined, if at all.68  In Mon-
tana, for instance, the state supreme court went so far as to say, “The legisla-
ture has not attempted to define the phrase ‘in furtherance of justice’ . . . , 
hence it is left for judicial discretion exercised in view of the constitutional 
rights of the defendant and the interests of society to determine what particu-
lar grounds warrant the dismissal of a pending criminal action.”69  This inten-
tional action by the legislature to grant the capacity to dismiss, and leave it 
open to definition by the judiciary through its own case law or rules of crimi-
nal procedure, provides an opportunity for courts to respond to the criminal 
justice crisis.   In New York, a court may dismiss an action “even though 
there may be no basis for dismissal as a matter of law.”70  Courts may make 
these determinations and consider the interests of society in an individual 
prosecution.  If embraced, this action may check overzealous prosecutions, 
lessen prison overcrowding, and right the injustice made most apparent in our 
system by wrongful convictions. 
B.  Dismissal in the Interest of Justice: Greater Transparency and  
Equitable Discretion 
This pivot away from prosecutors and toward courts through dismissal 
in the interest of justice brings greater transparency to our court system.  In 
contrast to a prosecutorial nolle prosequi of a case, court dismissal in the 
interest of justice must usually include reasoning on the record and considera-
tion of the equities of a case.71  This further instills transparency, as well as 
legitimacy and equity.  Courts may respond to not only penal ramifications of 
a sentence, but also the loss of civil privileges through state codes or immi-
 
1986); State v. Sonneland, 494 P.2d 469, 475 (Wash. 1972) (en banc) (Hale, J., dis-
senting). 
 67. People v. Rickert, 446 N.E.2d 419, 420 (1983). 
 68. See State v. Suave, 666 A.2d 1164, 1167 (Vt. 1995) (stating courts may dis-
miss “in rare and unusual cases when compelling circumstances require such a result 
to assure fundamental fairness in the administration of justice”). 
 69. State v. Cummins, 850 P.2d 952, 953 (Mont. 1993) (alteration in original) 
(quoting State ex rel. Anderson v. Gile, 172 P.2d 583, 586 (Mont. 1946)). 
 70. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.30 (2015) (allowing the dismissal of a com-
plaint because the instrument is defective, the defendant has immunity, the prosecu-
tion is barred because of previous prosecution, the prosecution is untimely, the de-
fendant has been denied a speedy trial, or the existence of some other jurisdictional or 
legal impediment). 
 71. See Sheila Kles, Criminal Procedure II: How Much Further is the Further-
ance of Justice, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 413, 414 (1991). 
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gration status.72  Thus, dismissal in the interest of justice can increase aware-
ness and reaction to the collateral consequences of a criminal sentence. 
C.  Pivoting Away from Prosecutorial Misconduct and Prosecutorial 
Discretion 
Furthermore, this power may be seen as most helpful for restoring pros-
ecutorial integrity and acknowledging misconduct.  After the Supreme Court 
decided Connick v. Thompson,73 grassroots efforts promoting prosecutorial 
oversight arose.  One such effort, the Prosecutorial Oversight Tour, sponsored 
in part by the Innocence Project, was created for the purpose of exploring 
policy reforms and to create a national dialogue on the issue.74  Another 
grassroots effort, the Veritas Initiative, tracks and publicizes court decisions 
on prosecutorial misconduct, analyzing how the court system identifies and 
addresses cases of prosecutorial misconduct.75  The findings thus far confirm 
the widespread belief that prosecutors are rarely held accountable for their 
actions, even in the wake of convicting innocent people.76 
Prosecutorial discretion is a pivotal place for reforming the system.  Be-
cause over 95% of federal defendants plead guilty and never go to trial,77 
prosecutors’ choices in charges and recommendations for sentencing deter-
mine the fate of the majority of people in the criminal justice system.78  Ra-
chel Barkow has written extensively on prosecutorial discretion, as well as 
what she calls “prosecutorial administration”: the role of prosecutors not only 
in individual cases, but also in corrections, forensics, and clemency policy 
 
 72. See State v. Rodriguez, No. 1722, 2008 WL 2627672, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 
July 3, 2008) (dismissing charges in part because conviction of an “aggravated felo-
ny” would have led to the defendant’s deportation). 
 73. 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
 74. See The Issue, Prosecutorial Oversight, PROSECUTORIALOVERSIGHT, 
http://www.prosecutorialoversight.org/about-the-issue (last visited July 1, 2015). 
 75. See About, VERITAS INITIATIVE, veritasinitiative.scu.edu/?page_id=2 (last 
visited July 1, 2015). 
 76. Maurice Possley & Jessica Seargeant, First Annual Report: Preventable 
Error - Prosecutorial Misconduct in California 2010, N. CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT 
(Mar. 2011), http://www.veritasinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/
ProsecutorialMisconduct_FirstAnnual_Final8.pdf. 
 77. Glenn R. Schmitt, Overview of Federal Criminal Cases: Fiscal Year 2009, 
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 3 (Dec. 2010), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/
pdf/research-and-publications/research-
publications/2010/20101230_FY09_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf (“In 
fiscal year 2009, more than 96 percent of all offenders [pleaded guilty], a rate that has 
been largely the same for ten years.”). 
 78. See Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: 
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 876–77 (2009). 
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and decision-making.79  In many ways, prosecutors hold the power of ulti-
mate determination in their hands. 
By dismissing cases and charges that are not in the interest of justice, 
judges can hold prosecutors accountable for overcharging and for prosecuting 
without evidence.  Courts can reinvigorate the standard that prosecutors must 
satisfy to affirmatively show that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
III.  SUPPORT FOR THE BENCH AND DISMISSAL IN THE INTEREST OF 
JUSTICE 
As noted by Akhil Amar, infamous cases such as Dred Scott v. Sand-
ford80 and Plessy v. Ferguson,81 act as negative symbols that define our Con-
stitution.82  Lincoln called Dred Scott “an astonisher in legal history,”83 and 
acted in his capacity as President to directly undermine the Court’s decision 
on constitutional principles.  The decision claimed that moral considerations 
were not relevant to considering constitutional issues.84  Professor Amar ar-
gues that Dred Scott85 plays a defining role in our Constitution, both in case 
law and in our culture.  In his words: 
Here is one way to connect the dots: In sharp contrast to America’s 
most disgraced cases, which protected haves at the expense of have-
nots, and insiders at the expense of outsiders, most of our icons of pos-
itive national identity have championed equality and reflected abiding 
concern for those at the bottom of the status hierarchy. . . .  In this pat-
tern resides a powerful lesson for how America’s unwritten Constitu-
tion is best interpreted and enforced – namely, to reinforce rather 
than to undercut the great themes of equality and inclusion in Ameri-
ca’s written Constitution.86 
These themes of equality and inclusion challenge our current criminal 
justice system – a system that arguably creates a second class of citizens, 
physically separated for sanctioned punishment and then civilly separated by 
shadowed collateral penalties.  Striving for equality and inclusion, justice and 
liberty, our Constitution calls for a broader understanding of responsibility for 
 
 79. See generally Rachel Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor 
Bias and the Department of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271 (2013). 
 80. 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
 81. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 82. AHKIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 270 (2012). 
 83. Lincoln made this statement in a July 1858 speech in Chicago.  Id. at 271. 
 84. Id. at 273. 
 85. Along with the cases of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, and Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 86. AMAR, supra note 82, at 275. 
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justice as a constitutional beckoning among the three branches.  As the Ninth 
Amendment clarified,87 simply because a specific path or protection is not 
enumerated by the Constitution does not negate its existence under the broad-
er spectrum of the Constitution’s priorities and purposes. 88  Indeed, although 
there is no federal capacity to dismiss in the interest of justice, this may be 
the state constitutional reasoning behind the creation of this power. 
This Article suggests that courts reclaim their capacity to dismiss cases 
and bring integrity to charges and cases in our justice system.  As a possibil-
ity for courts without this capacity, this Article ponders the capacity of the 
state’s highest court to pass a rule of criminal procedure that would recognize 
the often inherent power of trial courts to dismiss certain cases. 
A.  Why Non-Procedural Dismissals Matter 
As Justice Benjamin N. Cardozo eloquently argued over a century ago, 
it is a judge’s duty and obligation to adapt legal doctrine and precedent to our 
current modern justice system while also acting with fairness and impartiali-
ty.89  It is this combination of adherence to legal precedent and incorporation 
of fairness and impartiality that lead to the proper adjudication of cases and 
the functioning of what is our system of justice. 
Courts ensure that the federal and state constitutions are upheld, taking a 
vow and making a commitment to “establish Justice” under the Constitution’s 
Preamble.  A conviction in a criminal case may involve the loss of freedom as 
well as the stigma of a criminal record.  These serious ramifications should be 
considered when a case is procedurally accurate, and yet is not just.  In states 
where no other remedy is available, no motion may be made by the defense, 
and the prosecution continues unchecked – dismissal in the interest of justice 
upholds due process and acts with efficiency.  The court’s obligation is two-
fold: cases of due process are not “strictly limited to those situations in which 
the defendant has suffered arguable prejudice . . . [but is also designed] to 
maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.”90 
 
 87. The Ninth Amendment states, “The enumeration in the Constitution, of cer-
tain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage other rights retained by the 
people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IX.  “The Ninth Amendment tells to look beyond 
‘enumeration’ when interpreting – ‘construing’ – the Constitution.  It reminds us that 
not everything in the Constitution is textually itemized and specified.”  AMAR, supra 
note 82, at 100. 
 88. “Thus, even as the Ninth Amendment emphatically warns against certain 
anti-rights readings of the written Constitution based on mere negative implication, 
the amendment warmly invites certain pro-rights readings based on positive implica-
tions.”  AMAR, supra note 82, at 100. 
 89. See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS (1921). 
 90. United States v. Taylor, 648 F.2d 565, 571 (9th Cir. 1981) (referencing co-
ram nobis writs). 
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For administrative determinations, the Supreme Court of Ohio states the 
issue succinctly: 
Trial courts are on the front lines of administration of justice in our ju-
dicial system, dealing with the realities and practicalities of managing 
a caseload and responding to the rights and interests of the prosecu-
tion, the accused, and victims.  A court has the “inherent power to 
regulated the practice before it and protect the integrity of its proceed-
ings.”91  
Indeed, “Trial judges have the discretion to determine when the court 
has ceased to be useful in a given case.”92  Vermont also allows courts to 
consider efficiency and the “effective administration” of a court’s docket in 
dismissals.93 
B.  Increased Support for Judicial Discretion and Alternative       
Resolutions to Cases 
Growing support exists for judicial discretion, as well as alternative res-
olutions to cases in our criminal justice system.  An increasingly popular ju-
dicial approach is diverting first time drug offenders to one of the nation’s 
3400 drug courts for an alternative resolution.94  Drug courts generally assess 
and then monitor the offender and provide treatment services as well as sanc-
tions or incentives for completing the drug court program.95  Drug courts 
reduce recidivism,96 and some specifically assist juvenile offenders or of-
fenders’ families. 97 
Other specialized criminal courts are also growing: mental health courts, 
veterans’ courts, and reentry courts.98  In general, this trend supports reaf-
firming the power of state trial courts to dismiss cases in the interest of jus-
tice, if they have such capacity, or to claim that power if they do not. 
IV.  THREE STRIKES AND DISMISSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE 
Another use of dismissal in the interest of justice is dismissing prior 
convictions from consideration in current sentencing.  The “three strikes” law 
in California is a well-known example of a penal law focused on incapacita-
 
 91. State v. Busch, 669 N.E.2d 1125, 1128 (Ohio 1996). 
 92. Id. 
 93. VT. R. CRIM. PROC. 48(b)(1-2). 
 94. Drug Courts, NAT’L INS. OF JUSTICE, http://www.nij.gov/topics/courts/drug-
courts/Pages/welcome.aspx (last visited July 1, 2015). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See generally Allegra McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and 
Perils of a Shifting Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587 (2012). 
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tion, which has resulted in the growth of California’s prisons.99  California 
state courts’ response to this law, however, provides a pathway for other 
states facing mandatory lengthy sentences.  Dismissing allegations in the 
limited context of sentencing proactively responds to heightened sentencing 
for drug offenses. 
Courts in California have been capable of dismissing cases in the “fur-
therance of justice” since the California state legislature’s first meeting in 
1850.100  Under this codification, the court may, sua sponte or upon the pros-
ecutor’s motion, dismiss an action if dismissal is in the interest of the “fur-
therance of justice” and if the reasons for the dismissal are stated in the rec-
ord.101  Case law in California interprets this statute to allow a court to strike 
an allegation of a prior conviction for a serious felony, a legal fiction that 
defeats sentencing enhancements.102  In other words, the trial court can cir-
cumvent the state’s “three strikes rule” by dismissing from consideration the 
prosecutor’s allegation of a prior conviction.103 
Dismissal of a prior conviction allegation under California Penal Code 
Section 1385 “is not the equivalent of a determination that defendant did not 
in fact suffer the conviction.”104  Instead, it is an action to reinforce judicial 
discretion solely in sentencing and the consideration of enhancements.  Re-
cent case law supports this particular power – the power of the courts to di-
minish the rigid impact of three strikes legislation.105  In addition, a court may 
also strike a separate enhancement if it is in the “furtherance of justice.”106 
The Supreme Court of California affirmed the independence of trial 
judges to dismiss enhancements when it stated, 
 
 99. See Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395, 395–96 (1997). 
 100. See People v. Williams, 637 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Cal. 1981). 
 101. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385(a) (2013). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Indeed, in the 1993-1994 Regular Session of the California Legislature, the 
Senate Committee specifically considered the ability of courts to strike prior convic-
tions to avoid a life sentence when amended Section 1385, when petitioned by the 
prosecutor.  Cal. Senate Judiciary Comm., Bill Analysis-A.B. 971, at 9, Feb. 17, 1994 
(“While it is clear that the initiative does not allow district attorneys or judges to 
strike the current felony allegation, sponsors argue that inequitable results may be 
avoided by allowing the district attorney, but not the judge, to strike prior convictions, 
so that the life terms may not be imposed.”). 
 104. See In re Varnell, 70 P.3d 1037, 1041 (Cal. 2003). 
 105. See, e.g., People v. Lara, 281 P.3d 72 (Cal. 2012); People v. Clancey, 299 
P.3d 131 (Cal. 2013). 
 106. Clancey, 299 P.3d at 141–42.  In describing California Penal Code Section 
1385, the state legislature has said, “Penal Code Section 1385 provides that a court 
can strike an action, or any part thereof, in the interest of justice, unless the Legisla-
ture clearly limits that power.  Section 1385 includes the power to strike the punish-
ment that may be imposed for a crime or an enhancement, as well as the power to 
completely dismiss an action, a count, or an enhancement.”  A.B. 1808, 1999-2000 
Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2000). 
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The judicial power is compromised when a judge, who believes that a 
charge should be dismissed in the interests of justice, wishes to exer-
cise the power to dismiss but finds that before he may do so he must 
bargain with the prosecutor. The judicial power must be independent, 
and a judge should never be required to pay for its exercise.107  
The reason for dismissal, however, must be “that which would motivate 
a reasonable judge.”108  The court may dismiss the action in furtherance of 
justice at any time deemed appropriate: before, during, or after trial.109 
Twenty-seven states have a “three strikes” law;110 courts in six of those 
states, including California, can dismiss in the interest of justice.  Courts in 
the other five states – Massachusetts, Montana, Utah, Vermont, and Washing-
ton111 – could follow California’s example.  By dismissing a prior conviction 
from consideration, these courts could regain control over sentencing. 
V.  APPLICATION OF DISMISSAL IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE: 
MISDEMEANORS 
Dismissal in the interest of justice reinforces equitable discretion pre-
dominantly at a misdemeanor level.  Misdemeanors are a realistic space 
where judicial clemency matters, impacting the “gateway” to cycling through 
the criminal justice system.  As noted by Jenny Roberts,112 the impact of mis-
demeanors that ensnare individuals in our prison system – often with little to 
no evidence and little to no representation – should not be casually underes-
timated. 
 
 107. Clancey, 299 P.3d at 142 (citing People v. Tenorio, 473 P.2d 993, 996 (Cal. 
1970)). 
 108. People v. Orin, 533 P.2d 193, 199 (Cal. 1975) (en bank) (quoting People v. 
Curtis, 84 Cal. Rptr. 106, 126 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970)).  It should be noted, however, that 
a trial court cannot dismiss sex offender registration under Section 1385.  See People 
v. Tuck, 139 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 412–13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). 
 109. See People v. Uribe, 132 Cal. Rtpr. 3d 102, 141 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
 110. Allen Hopper et al., Shifting the Paradigm or Shifting the Problem? The 
Politics of California’s Criminal Justice Realignment, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 527, 
543 (2014). 
 111. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (2015), with MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
279, § 25 (2015), MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-502 (2014), UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-
203.5 (2014), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 11 (2015), and WASH. REV. CODE § 
9.94A.570 (2015). 
 112. See generally Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective 
Advocacy in the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277 (2011). 
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A.  Dismissal in the Interest of Justice and Misdemeanors 
An estimated 10 million misdemeanor cases are filed annually.113  Mis-
demeanors account for the vast majority of state criminal dockets114 and con-
tinue to grow in number.115  In major metropolitan areas, such as Chicago, 
Atlanta, and Miami, public defenders handle more than 2000 misdemeanor 
cases each year.116  Excessive caseloads for defenders make misdemeanants 
more likely to suffer from ineffective assistance of counsel.117  And yet, mis-
demeanants are not even necessarily entitled to counsel.  In Texas, for exam-
ple, counsel is appointed in fewer than 20% of jailable misdemeanor cases 
across three-fourths of its counties.118  This structurally casual response to 
misdemeanor charges statistically leads to innocent individuals being pun-
ished for crimes they did not commit.119  When defendants do not have the 
assistance of counsel, they often plead guilty, even when there is little or no 
evidence.120  Yet the innocence of defendants charged with misdemeanors is 
rarely considered. 
The civil consequences of a misdemeanor conviction can have harsh 
economic and social ramifications.  A simple misdemeanor can make an in-
dividual ineligible for professional licenses, student loans, health care, child 
 
 113. Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1314–15 
(2012). 
 114. Robert C. LaFountain et al., Examining the Work of State Courts: An Analy-
sis of 2008 State Court Caseloads, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS 1, 47 (2010), 
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSC-2008-
Online.ashx (finding 79% of cases across eleven state courts were misdemeanors). 
 115. Roberts, supra note 112, at 282. 
 116. See Robert C. Boruchowitz et al., Minor Crimes, Massive Waste: The Terri-
ble Toll of America’s Broken Misdemeanor Courts, NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. 
LAWYERS 1, 11 (2009), https://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?
id=20808 (citing National Center for State Courts, 2007 Criminal Caseloads Report 
finding that in data gathered in 12 states in 2006, there was a “median misdemeanor 
rate of 3,544 per 100,000” people). 
 117. Many of these cases, however, are never appealed and thus never receive a 
court determination on effective assistance of counsel.  See Donald J. Farole, Jr. & 
Lynn Langton, A National Assessment of Public Defender Office Caseloads, 94 
JUDICATURE 87, 90 (2010) (concluding that lack of personnel and resources across 
country prevents effective representation of indigent defendants); David Carroll, Gid-
eon Alert: DOJ Data Confirms Existence of Right to Counsel Workload Crisis in the 
United States, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASS’N (Sep. 17, 2010), 
http://www.nlada.net/jseri/blog/gideon-alert-doj-data-confirms-existence-right-
counsel-workload-crisis-united-states. 
 118. Boruchowitz et al., supra note 116, at 10 (stating, “Three-quarters of Texas 
counties appoint counsel in fewer than 20 percent of jailable misdemeanor cases, with 
the majority of those counties appointing counsel in fewer than 10 percent of cases”). 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id. 
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custody, and public housing.121  A misdemeanor conviction can even lead to 
deportation.122  With quick Internet access to criminal records, employers and 
landlords can easily search and then refuse employment and housing.123  Em-
ployment and family support are also disrupted when defendants serve time 
in jail, either because they were denied bail or as part of a sentence.124  In-
deed, pre-trial detention for individuals who cannot pay bail often incentiviz-
es them to take an early plea with a sentence of time served or probation, 
whether or not they committed the crime.125 
Finally, misdemeanor convictions disproportionately impact poor com-
munities and communities of color because “vulnerable, underrepresented 
defendants tend to plead guilty even in the absence of evidence.”126  With 
arrests determining convictions, law enforcement determines who ultimately 
has a misdemeanor conviction on his record.  Arrest policies, such as urban 
drug sweeps or zero tolerance policing, thus lead not only to arrests but also 
convictions. 
While these arrests and misdemeanor convictions may appear harmless 
– brushed off as only a night in prison – they not only carry collateral civil 
consequences, but they also begin a cycle of racial discrepancy in the prison 
system.  These convictions label a person as a criminal without the general 
evidentiary requirements that would stop an arrest from becoming a criminal 
complaint, and a complaint from becoming a conviction. As Bernard Har-
court has pointed out, if our sentencing system is increasingly based on crim-
inal history as its key factor, then any contacts with the criminal system, in-
cluding arrests and misdemeanor convictions, negatively impact a defend-
 
 121. See Margaret Colgate Love, Paying Their Debt to Society: Forgiveness, 
Redemption, and the Uniform Collateral Consequences of Conviction Act, 54 HOW. 
L.J. 753, 770 (2011) (describing expanded scope and severity of collateral penalties in 
federal and state law in past two decades).  See also 20 U.S.C.A. §1091(r)(1) (West 
2014) (listing varying ineligibility periods for federal student loans, based on number 
of drug-related convictions); 21 U.S.C.A. §862a(a) (West 2014) (discussing bars to 
public benefits for individuals convicted of a misdemeanor); 42 U.S.C. §13661(b) 
(2012) (discussing bars to public housing for individuals convicted of a drug crime). 
 122. See Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; ‘This Has Got Me in Some Kind of 
Whirlwind,’ N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/
2000/01/08/opinion/abroad-at-home-this-has-got-me-in-some-kind-of-whirlwind.html 
(describing deportation order against Mary Anne Gehris, who was adopted and 
brought to United States as an infant, based on misdemeanor conviction from her 
young adulthood).  Because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 
559 U.S. 356 (2010), that defense counsel must advise clients of collateral conse-
quences to convictions, such as deportation, a few misdemeanor cases are being ex-
amined on appeal for ineffective assistance of counsel for not informing their clients.  
See Roberts, supra note 112, at 320. 
 123. See Roberts, supra note 112, at 299. 
 124. See id. 
 125. Id. at 308. 
 126. Natapoff, supra note 113, at 1315. 
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ant’s sentencing score and lead to a higher sentence for people of color.127  
The label that begins with a misdemeanor transforms that person into a crim-
inal for years to come. 
With the high number of individuals charged with misdemeanors every 
year, a court’s capacity to dismiss in the interest of justice both brings equity 
to these cases and is a practical resolution in managing a court’s docket.  
While the flooding of misdemeanor cases has generally created pressure on a 
defendant to plead guilty, a court could instead encourage the system to func-
tion as it should, both procedurally and equitably.  Dismissal acknowledges 
the lack of acceptable representation on the part of the defense, as well as 
charging with little actual evidence on the part of the prosecution.  By enforc-
ing the standards applicable for other criminal charges in the courtroom, the 
court can avoid wrongful convictions while also pragmatically resolving their 
own overwhelmed dockets. 
B.  Conceptual Comparisons to De Minimis Infractions 
The Model Penal Code makes provisions for the dismissal of “de mini-
mis infractions” – cases where the harm of the offense was “only to an extent 
too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction.”128  Four states have 
adopted a de minimis exception: Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, and Pennsylva-
nia.129  The full name of de minimis non curat lex has been interpreted as “the 
law does not concern itself with trifling matters.”130 
 
 127. Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assess-
ment, 27 FED. SENT. R. 237, 238 (2015). 
 128. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.12 (2013). 
 
The Court shall dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the nature of the 
conduct charged to constitute an offense and the nature of the attendant cir-
cumstances, it finds that the defendant’s conduct: 
(1) was within a customary license or tolerance, neither expressly nega-
tived by the person whose interest was infringed nor inconsistent with the 
purpose of the law defining the offense; or 
(2) did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be pre-
vented by the law defining the offense or did so only to an extent too triv-
ial to warrant the condemnation of conviction; or 
(3) presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regarded 
as envisaged by the legislature in forbidding the offense. 
The Court shall not dismiss a prosecution under Subsection (3) of this Section 
without filing a written statement of its reasons). 
 
Id. 
 129. Each of these states has a version of Section 2.12.  See HAW. REV. STAT. § 
702-236 (2015); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 12 (2015); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:2-11 
(2015); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.  § 312 (2015).  Guam also includes a de minimis provi-
sion.  See 8 GUAM CODE ANN. § 130.50 (2015). 
 130. Max L. Veech & Charles R. Moon, De Minimis Non Curat Lex, 45 MICH. L. 
REV. 537, 538 (1947). 
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De minimis dismissals may conceptually assist in determining dismis-
sals “in the interest of justice,” particularly for minor drug offenses.131  The 
de minimis exception “does not exculpate a defendant because of a justifying 
or excusing condition, but rather serves to refine the offense definition . . . 
[the defendant] is ‘outside the harm or evil sought to be prevented and pun-
ished by the offense.’”132  Other conceptualizations focus on justification: 
logic and support for the prohibited action that does not cancel out the allega-
tion, but instead rationalizes the action or even neutralizes its harm.133  Per-
haps for petty offenses, equitable considerations of the case should prevail 
over the blameworthiness of the defendant.134  This is precisely the province 
of the court in deciding dismissals in the interest of justice. 
VI.  STATE LAWS AND RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
As previous Parts have noted, judicial clemency and in particular, dis-
missal in the interest of justice, may be a route for courts to influence over-
zealous prosecutors, lessen the war on drugs, and decrease mass incarcera-
tion.  Similar to executive clemency, the numeric impact of these actions is 
necessarily smaller and more individualized than legislation reducing the 
disparity between crack cocaine and powder cocaine sentences, for example.  
Its impact, however, is important nonetheless.  Wrongful convictions re-
vealed through DNA evidence are a small fraction of cases in our criminal 
justice system, and their weight is important to the culture of our system as 
well as to the individual.  The same can be true of state judicial dismissals.135 
 
 131. See, e.g., State v. Vance, 602 P.2d 933, 944 (Haw. 1979) (affirming convic-
tion, but finding, “The possession of a microscopic trace of a dangerous drug in com-
bination with other factors indicating an inability to use or sell the narcotic, may con-
stitute a de minimis infraction within the meaning of HRS s 702-236 and therefore 
warrant dismissal of the charge otherwise sustainable under HRS s 712-1243”). 
 132. See Douglas Husak, The De Minimis “Defense” to Criminal Liability, UNIV. 
OF CAL. BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW 1, 20 (Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.law.
berkeley.edu/files/De_Minimis2_DHusak.pdf (quoting PAUL ROBINSON, CRIMINAL 
LAW DEFENSES 324 (1984)).  If courts look more to justification for dismissal in fur-
therance of justice, then it may be presumed that such justifications would be circum-
stances where the defendant violated the law to avoid a greater social harm, or to gain 
a greater societal benefit.  See id. at 12.  In the words of Akhil Amar, “normative 
innocence” is where the defendant “did it, but . . . did not thereby offend the public’s 
moral code.”  AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
FIRST PRINCIPLES 90 (1997). 
 133. See Husak, supra note 132, at 21. 
 134. See generally Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equi-
table Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655 (2010) (describing “easy 
cases” where there is sufficient proof of guilt, yet insufficient consideration of wheth-
er the prosecution serves the ultimate ends of justice). 
 135. See Death Penalty, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
free-innocent/improve-the-law/related-issues (last visited July 11, 2015). 
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A.  States and Dismissal in the Interest of Justice 
Twelve states recognize the judicial capacity to dismiss cases in the in-
terest of justice.136  Of these twelve states, seven – California,137 Idaho,138 
Minnesota,139 Montana,140 New York,141 Oklahoma,142 and Oregon143 – have 
 
 136. See sources cited supra note 66. 
 137. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385(a) (2015) (“The judge or magistrate may, 
either of his or her own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, 
and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed. The reasons for the 
dismissal shall be stated orally on the record. The court shall also set forth the rea-
sons in an order entered upon the minutes if requested by either party or in any case in 
which the proceedings are not being recorded electronically or reported by a court 
reporter. A dismissal shall not be made for any cause that would be ground of demur-
rer to the accusatory pleading.”). 
 138. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-3504 (2015) (“The court may, either of its own 
motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of jus-
tice, order an action or indictment to be dismissed.  The reasons of the dismissal must 
be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes.”). 
 139. See MINN. STAT. § 631.21 (2015) (“The court may order a criminal action, 
whether prosecuted upon indictment or complaint, to be dismissed.  The court may 
order dismissal of an action either on its own motion or upon motion of the prosecut-
ing attorney and in furtherance of justice.  If the court dismisses an action, the reasons 
for the dismissal must be set forth in the order and entered upon the minutes.  The 
recommendations of the prosecuting officer in reference to dismissal, with reasons for 
dismissal, must be stated in writing and filed as a public record with the official files 
of the case.”). 
 140. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-13-401(1) (2015) (“The court may, either on its 
own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney and in furtherance of 
justice, order a complaint, information, or indictment to be dismissed.  However, the 
court may not order a dismissal of a complaint, information, or indictment, or a count 
contained in a complaint, information, or indictment, charging a felony, unless good 
cause for dismissal is shown and the reasons for the dismissal are set forth in an order 
entered upon the minutes.”). 
 141. The Superior Court rule is N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40.1 (“An indict-
ment or any count thereof may be dismissed in furtherance of justice, as provided in 
paragraph (i) of subdivision one of Section 210.20, when, even though there may be 
no basis for dismissal as a matter of law upon any ground specified in paragraphs (a) 
through (h) of said subdivision one of Section 210.20, such dismissal is required as a 
matter of judicial discretion by the existence of some compelling factor, consideration 
or circumstance clearly demonstrating that conviction or prosecution of the defendant 
upon such indictment or count would constitute or result in injustice.”).  The Local 
Criminal Court rule is N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.40.1 (“An information, a simpli-
fied traffic information, a prosecutor’s information or a misdemeanor complaint, or 
any count thereof, may be dismissed in the interest of justice, as provided in para-
graph (g) of subdivision one of Section 170.30 when, even though there may be no 
basis for dismissal as a matter of law upon any ground specified in paragraphs (a) 
through (f) of said subdivision one of Section 170.30, such dismissal is required as a 
matter of judicial discretion by the existence of some compelling factor, consideration 
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codified the right of state court judges to dismiss either information or in-
dictments144 sua sponte145 if such dismissal is in the “furtherance of justice.”  
Five states – Alaska,146 Iowa,147 Utah,148 Vermont,149 and Washington150 – 
 
or circumstance clearly demonstrating that conviction or prosecution of the defendant 
upon such accusatory instrument or count would constitute or result in injustice.”). 
 142. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 815 (2015) (“The court may either of its own mo-
tion or upon the application of the district attorney, and the furtherance of justice, 
order an action or indictment to be dismissed; but in that case the reasons of the dis-
missal must be set forth in the order, which must be entered upon the minutes.”). 
 143. See OR. REV. STAT. § 135.755 (2015) (“The court may, either of its own 
motion or upon the application of the district attorney, and in furtherance of justice, 
order the proceedings to be dismissed.  The reasons for the dismissal shall be set forth 
in the order, which shall be entered in the register.”). 
 144. An information is generally for a misdemeanor complaint, while an indict-
ment is for a felony complaint. 
 145. These states also retain the common law standing by which the prosecution 
may make such a motion; only two states, Utah and New York, allow the defendant to 
make a motion asking the Court to dismiss the case “in the interest of justice.”  See 
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40(3); UTAH R. CRIM. PROC. 25(a). 
 146. ALASKA R. CRIM. PROC. 43(c) (“The court may, either on its own motion or 
upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order 
an action, after indictment or waiver of indictment, to be dismissed.  The reasons for 
the dismissal shall be set forth in the order.”). 
 147. IOWA R. CIV. PROC. 2.33(1) (“The court, upon its own motion or the applica-
tion of the prosecuting attorney, in the furtherance of justice, may order the dismissal 
of any pending criminal prosecution, the reasons therefor being stated in the order and 
entered of record, and no such prosecution shall be discontinued or abandoned in any 
other manner.  Such a dismissal is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense if 
it is a simple or serious misdemeanor; but it is not a bar if the offense charged be a 
felony or an aggravated misdemeanor.”). 
 148. See UTAH R. CRIM. PROC. 25(a) (“In its discretion, for substantial cause and 
in furtherance of justice, the court may, either on its own initiative or upon application 
of either party, order an information or indictment dismissed.”). 
 149. See VT. R. CRIM. PROC. 48(b)(2) (“The court may dismiss the indictment or 
information . . . If the court concludes that such dismissal will serve the ends of jus-
tice and the effective administration of the court’s business.  Unless the court directs 
that the dismissal is with prejudice, the dismissal shall be without prejudice.”). 
 150. See WASH. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R. 8.3 (“The court, in the furtherance of justice, 
after notice and hearing, may dismiss any criminal prosecution due to arbitrary action 
or governmental misconduct when there has been prejudice to the rights of the ac-
cused which materially affect the accused’s right to a fair trial.  The court shall set 
forth its reasons in a written order.”); WASH. CT. OF LTD. JURISDICTION CRIM. R. 8.3 
(“The court, in the furtherance of justice after notice and hearing, may dismiss any 
criminal prosecution due to arbitrary action or governmental misconduct when there 
has been prejudice to the rights of the accused which materially affect the accused’s 
right to a fair trial.  The court shall set forth its reasons in a written order.”).  For dis-
missal of civil cases, Rule 60(b) applies: 
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have state rules of criminal procedure that grant judges the authority to dis-
miss indictments or information “in the furtherance of justice.”  Puerto Rico 
also has a local rule of criminal procedure for courts to “order the superses-
sion of a charge or complaint” for the “furtherance of justice.”151 
In these twelve states, judges have the power to dismiss the information 
or indictment sua sponte.  These states also retain the common law standing 
by which the prosecution may make such a motion;152 only two states, Utah 
and New York, allow the defendant to make a motion to dismiss the case “in 
 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the follow-
ing reasons: 
(1) Mistakes, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or irregularity in 
obtaining a judgment or order; 
(2) For erroneous proceedings against a minor or person of unsound 
mind, when the condition of such defendant does not appear in the rec-
ord, nor the error in the proceedings; 
(3) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under rule 59(b); 
(4) Fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrep-
resentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(5) The judgment is void; 
(6) The judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior 
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, 
or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective ap-
plication; 
(7) If the defendant was served by publication, relief may be granted as 
prescribed in RCW 4.28.200; 
(8) Death of one of the parties before the judgment in the action; 
(9) Unavoidable casualty or misfortune preventing the party from prose-
cuting or defending; 
(10) Error in judgment shown by a minor, within 12 months after arriving 
at full age; or 
(11) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judg-
ment. 
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2) or 
(3) not more than 1 year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered 
or taken.  If the party entitled to relief is a minor or a person of unsound mind, 
the motion shall be made within 1 year after the disability ceases.  A motion 
under this section (b) does not affect the finality of the judgment or suspend 
its operation. 
 
WASH. CT. OF LTD. JURISDICTION CRIM. R. 60(b). 
 151. P.R. R. CRIM. PROC. 247(b) (“When it is deemed convenient for the further-
ance of justice and upon holding a hearing in which the prosecuting attorney shall 
participate, the court may order the supersession of a charge or complaint.  The causes 
for the supersession shall be set forth in an order issued to such effects, which shall be 
attached to the record of the proceeding.”). 
 152. See sources cited supra note 66. 
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the interest of justice.”153  All the noted states, except Vermont, require the 
court to state its reasons on the record for dismissal.154  In Vermont, the court 
must only do so if the prosecution objects to the dismissal.155  The states vary 
as to whether the dismissal will be with or without prejudice, thus potentially 
barring the State from bringing the same charges again.156 
1.  State Specific Statutes 
Looking at some examples of court-instigated dismissals help to eluci-
date the varied considerations of all states and state courts in making these 
determinations.  In Montana, the court must show good cause for the dismis-
sal,157 while in New York, ten factors must be considered, as well as “a com-
pelling factor, consideration, or circumstance demonstrating that the convic-
tion would constitute injustice.”158  Utah requires not only that the dismissal 
be in the “furtherance of justice,” but also that a “substantial cause” exist for 
dismissal.159  In Ohio, a court may dismiss an indictment, information, or 
complaint over the objection of the State, provided that the court declares on 
the record the findings of fact and reasons for dismissal.160  New York and 
 
 153. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40(3) (McKinney 2015); UTAH R. CRIM. 
PROC. 25(a).  The prosecutor may also motion for dismissal in all twelve states.  See 
sources cited supra note 66. 
 154. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385 (2015); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-3504 (2015); 
MINN. STAT. § 631.21 (2015); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46–13–401 (2015); OKLA. STAT. 
tit. 22, § 815 (2015); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.755 (2015); ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 43(c); 
IOWA R. CIV. P. 2.33(1); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40; P.R. R. CRIM. P. 247(b); 
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 25; WASH. R. CRIM. P. 8.3. 
 155. See VT. R. CRIM. PROC. 48(c). 
 156. Of the twelve laws, only four states have any mention of what the effect 
dismissal will have on future prosecution: Montana, Vermont, Utah, and Iowa.  Mon-
tana’s law states that the prosecution after the entry of a plea on a misdemeanor 
charge will be dismissed, unless good cause is shown, with prejudice if the defendant 
is not brought to trial within six months.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-13-401(2) (2015).  
Vermont directs every dismissal to be without prejudice unless the court states other-
wise.  VT. R. CRIM. PROC. 48(b).  Utah and Iowa’s laws, on the other hand, are some-
what similar because a potential bar on prosecution ultimately depends on what the 
original crime dismissed was.  Iowa states that if the charge dismissed was a simple or 
serious misdemeanor than future prosecution for the same offense is thereby barred; 
however, if the charge was a felony or aggravated misdemeanor than future prosecu-
tion is not barred.  See IOWA R. CRIM. PROC. 2.33(1); UTAH R. CRIM. PROC. 25. 
 157. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-13-401(1) (2015). 
 158. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.40(1). 
 159. UTAH R. CRIM. PROC. 25(a). 
 160. OHIO CRIM. R. 48 (“If the court over objection of the state dismisses an in-
dictment, information, or complaint, it shall state on the record its findings of fact and 
reasons for the dismissal.”).  In State v. Busch, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that 
“[Rule 48(b)] does not limit the reasons for which a trial judge might dismiss a case, 
and we are convinced that a judge may dismiss a case pursuant to Crim. R. 48(B) if a 
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California represent two notable ends of the spectrum for dismissals in the 
interest of justice. 
a.  New York 
In New York, Criminal Procedure Law Section 170.40 provides that an 
information or misdemeanor complaint may be dismissed in the interest of 
justice when it “is required as a matter of judicial discretion by the existence 
of some compelling factor, consideration or circumstance[,]” which demon-
strates that prosecuting the defendant “would constitute or result in injus-
tice.”161  Such dismissal may occur “even though there may be no basis for 
dismissal as a matter of law.”162  Said dismissal may be initiated by the court, 
the prosecution, or by the defendant.163 
In dismissing the information, the court must state its reasons for doing 
so on the record and must examine or consider multiple factors.164  The stat-
 
dismissal serves the interest of justice.”  699 N.E.2d 1125, 1127–28 (Ohio 1996).  
Ohio courts have interpreted Criminal Rule of Procedure 48(b) as “creating a substan-
tive right for a court to sua sponte dismiss a criminal case over the objection of the 
prosecution where the complaining witness does not wish the case to proceed, or in 
the interest of justice.”  State v. Rodriguez, No. 1722, 2008 WL 2627672, at *2, (Ohio 
Ct. App. July 3, 2008) (citing Busch, 669 N.E.2d 1125).  In Ohio, the Court is re-
quired to state on the record its findings of fact and reasons for dismissal.  Id. 
 161. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.40.1.  The Superior Court rule is N.Y. CRIM. 
PROC. LAW § 210.40.1 and the Local Criminal Court rule is N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 
170.40.1 (“An information, a simplified traffic information, a prosecutor’s infor-
mation or a misdemeanor complaint, or any count thereof, may be dismissed in the 
interest of justice, as provided in paragraph (g) of subdivision one of Section 170.30 
when, even though there may be no basis for dismissal as a matter of law upon any 
ground specified in paragraphs (a) through (f) of said subdivision one of Section 
170.30, such dismissal is required as a matter of judicial discretion by the existence of 
some compelling factor, consideration or circumstance clearly demonstrating that 
conviction or prosecution of the defendant upon such accusatory instrument or count 
would constitute or result in injustice.”). 
 162. Id. § 170.30–.40 (allowing the dismissal of a complaint because the instru-
ment is defective, the defendant has immunity, the prosecution is barred because of 
previous prosecution, the prosecution is untimely, the defendant has been denied a 
speedy trial, or the existence of some other jurisdictional or legal impediment). 
 163. Id. § 170.40(2). 
 164. In determining whether a “compelling factor, consideration, or circumstance” 
exists, the court must examine and consider ten factors: 
 
(a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense; 
(b) the extent of harm caused by the offense; 
(c) the evidence of guilt, whether admissible or inadmissible at trial; 
(d) the history, character and condition of the defendant; 
(e) any exceptionally serious misconduct of law enforcement personnel in the 
investigation, arrest and prosecution of the defendant; 
29
Beety: Judicial Dismissal in the Interest of Justice
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
658 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
ute specifying the current ten factors expresses the legislative intent “to per-
mit consideration of a broad range of factors basically unrelated to guilt or 
innocence.”165  The trial court’s capacity to dismiss a case sua sponte was 
first derived through case law in People v. Clayton, which was later codi-
fied.166  The parallel power for dismissing felonies rests in Criminal Proce-
 
(f) the purpose and effect of imposing upon the defendant a sentence author-
ized for the offense; 
(g) the impact of a dismissal on the safety or welfare of the community; 
(h) the impact of a dismissal upon the confidence of the public in the criminal 
justice system; 
(i) where the court deems it appropriate, the attitude of the complainant or vic-
tim with respect to the motion; 
(j) any other relevant fact indicating that a judgment of conviction would 
serve no useful purpose. 
 
Id. § 170.40(1)(a)-(j).  These factors must be considered both individually and collec-
tively.  N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.40(1).  The ten factors listed in § 179.40 were 
added as clarification to the existing rule, and became effective on January 1, 1980.  
People v. Prunty, 420 N.Y.S.2d 703, 706 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1979).  Prior to this clarifi-
cation, People v. Clayton provided guidance for courts trying to determine the mean-
ing of a “compelling factor.”  41 A.D.2d 204, 206–08 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973).  Clay-
ton listed the following seven factors that a court may consider in determining wheth-
er an accusatory instrument should be dismissed in the interests of justice: 
 
(a) the nature of the crime, (b) the available evidence of guilt, (c) the prior 
record of the defendant, (d) the punishment already suffered by the defendant, 
(e) the purpose and effect of further punishment, (f) any prejudice resulting to 
the defendant by the passage of time and (g) the impact on the public interest 
of a dismissal of the indictment. 
 
Id. at 207–08.  The Court of Appeals of New York, in People v. Belge, condoned the 
use of the Clayton factors, calling the judiciary’s efforts to clarify the statute “com-
mendable,” and urged that the “predicament” was “more appropriate for legislative 
resolution.”  359 N.E.2d 377, 378 (N.Y. 1976) (per curiam).  Three years later, the 
New York Legislature added ten factors to the statute that courts must consider in 
granting a motion to dismiss in the interest of justice.  Compare Clayton, 41 A.D.2d 
at 207–08, with N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.40.1(a)-(j) (Clayton is no longer bind-
ing precedent, but many of the factors contained in its opinion have been added to the 
language of Section 170.40). 
 165. Peter Preiser, Practice Commentaries, WESTLAW (reviewing N.Y. CRIM. 
PROC. LAW § 170.40). 
 166. Clayton, 41 A.D. 2d at 207–08. 
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dure Law Section 210.40.167  If a case is dismissed “in the furtherance of jus-
tice,” court approval is required for re-indictment.168 
Despite being the first state to authorize courts to dismiss cases on their 
own initiative, New York case law restricts its usage.169  Indeed, New York 
case law in recent years has found that a dismissal in the “interest of justice” 
does not include a defendant’s age and likelihood of death if incarcerated,170 
military and public service,171 misconduct on the part of the prosecutor,172 or 
a serious medical condition suffered by the defendant.173  The New York 
Supreme Court of Appeals has held, “Dismissal of an indictment in the inter-
est of justice must be exercised sparingly . . . that is, only in those rare cases 
where there is a compelling factor which clearly demonstrates that prosecu-
tion of the indictment would be an injustice.”174 
b.  California 
The capacity for California courts to dismiss in the “furtherance of jus-
tice” was bestowed by the state legislature in 1850, the same year California 
became a state.175  In California, the court may sua sponte dismiss an action, 
or may do so upon a prosecutor’s motion, as long as the reasons for the dis-
missal are stated in the record and it is in the furtherance of justice.176  No 
specific factors exist to support dismissal in the interest of justice, the oppo-
site of the detailed specifications for dismissal in New York.  As noted earli-
er, the statute is most frequently used to dismiss an allegation of a prior con-
viction at sentencing, in order to avoid “three strikes” laws. 
2.  Recommendations 
Although states vary in their implementation of this right of courts, this 
Article recommends the consideration of factors similar to the standard ap-
 
 167. See Wirenius, supra note 58, at 181 (“When the Code of Criminal Procedure 
was superseded by the Criminal Procedure Law, Section 671 was renumbered Section 
210.40, and the defendant was permitted to move for dismissal in the interest of jus-
tice, not just the district attorney or the court.”) (citing People v. Graydon, 330 
N.Y.S.2d 259, 262 (Nassau Cnty. Ct. 1972); People v. Shanis, 374 N.Y.S.2d 912, 917 
(Sup. Ct. Queens Cnty. 1975)). 
 168. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.20(4). 
 169. See People v. Miller, 963 N.Y.S.2d 552, 553 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 2013) (citing 
People v. Littles, 591 N.Y.S.2d 2 (1st Dept., 1992). 
 170. People v. Marshall, 961 N.Y.S.2d 447, 453–54 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
 171. See id. 
 172. People v. Schellenbach, 888 N.Y.S.2d 153 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (finding 
prosecutor’s conduct did not rise to the level of “exceptionally serious misconduct”). 
 173. People v. Sherman, 35 A.D.3d 768, 769 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006). 
 174. People v. May, 100 A.D.3d 1411, 1413(N.Y. 2012). 
 175. See People v. Williams, 637 P.2d 1029, 1032 (Cal. 1981). 
 176. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385(a) (2013). 
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plied in New York.  The New York standard allows the court freedom to 
dismiss a case “even though there may be no basis for dismissal as a matter of 
law.”177  The New York standard also requires reasoning of specific, enumer-
ated factors on the record.178  If our current judicial system suffers from a 
lack of transparency as to why an individual is prosecuted, New York’s 
standard brings sunlight into the courtroom.  Requiring stated reasons on the 
record encourages, or maintains, transparency. 
New York courts may dismiss when “some compelling factor, consider-
ation or circumstance” demonstrates that prosecution of the defendant “would 
constitute or result in injustice.”179  The ten factors that the court is expected 
to examine or consider include information about the offense, the defendant, 
the prosecution and the state investigation, as well as the purpose and effect 
of the sentence, the welfare of the community, and public confidence in the 
criminal justice system.180  These latter factors – community welfare, public 
confidence, the purpose and effect of a sentence – are of great importance to 
the continued effectiveness and efficiency of our court system.  Yet courts are 
infrequently granted the ability to consider these factors.  The New York stat-
ute specifically expresses the legislative intent “to permit consideration of a 
broad range of factors basically unrelated to guilt or innocence.”181 
As noted previously, at the height of the AIDS epidemic, courts were 
asked to dismiss in the interest of justice against terminally ill defendants.182  
Likewise, in our current state of mass incarceration and harsh penalties for 
drug crimes, considerations could include the impact of drug convictions on 
communities, the diminishing confidence in our system when drug sentences 
are disproportionately served by poor people and people of color, and the 
effect of a conviction on an individual’s capacity to even be employed.  These 
are the vast, overarching questions that are being raised about our system, 
without answers.  Dismissal in the interest of justice allows courts to respond 
to those greater questions instead of being compelled by prosecutorial control 
to simply dispense sentences.  Furthermore, the court, the prosecutor, or the 
defendant should have the capacity to request that a case be dismissed in the 
interest of justice,183 contrary to our nation’s current status: only two states 
allow for defendants to request dismissal in the interest of justice.184 
 
 177. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.30–.40 (allowing the dismissal of a complaint 
because the instrument is defective, the defendant has immunity, the prosecution is 
barred because of previous prosecution, the prosecution is untimely, the defendant has 
been denied a speedy trial, or the existence of some other jurisdictional or legal im-
pediment). 
 178. Id. § 170.40(2). 
 179. Id. § 170.40. 
 180. See supra note 164. 
 181. Preiser, supra note 165. 
 182. See Wirenius, supra note 58, at 218–20. 
 183. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.40(2). 
 184. See supra note 145. 
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This Article also encourages adopting the California model of dismiss-
ing prior convictions from consideration when sentencing an offender under 
“three strikes” laws.  This action reinforces judicial discretion in sentencing, 
an area where federal judges have expressed their discontent with the manda-
tory minimum sentences that originated in the 1990s.185  Federal judges are 
calling for changes to the mandatory minimum sentencing structure.186  The 
ability to dismiss prior sentences from consideration and to strike additional 
enhancements if it is in the “furtherance of justice” 187 provides discretion to 
courts that are applying “three strikes” legislation.188 
B.  State Rules of Criminal Procedure 
For the states that currently do not grant courts the authority to dismiss 
cases in the furtherance of justice, this Article proposes creating new state 
rules of criminal procedure.  The judiciary itself, notably by the state supreme 
court, often creates rules with approval by the legislature; five of the states 
that allow courts to dismiss cases do so through state rules of criminal proce-
dure.189 
As far back as the late 1800s, the Supreme Court of the United States 
recognized the inherent power of courts to prescribe rules, regulate their pro-
ceedings, and facilitate the administration of justice.190  Indeed, in 1792, the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court stated that the Court “considers the prac-
tice of the courts of King’s Bench and Chancery of England as affording out-
lines for the practice of this court, and that they will, from time to time, make 
such alterations therein as circumstances may render necessary.”191  Not-
withstanding the inherent rule-making power of courts, in many jurisdictions, 
 
 185. See Carr, supra note 54. 
 186. See Mauro, supra note 55. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See People v. Lara, 281 P.3d 72, 72–75 (Cal. 2012); People v. Clancey, 299 
P.3d 131, 141 (Cal. 2013). 
 189. A rule, however, should neither extend nor abridge the court’s jurisdiction.  
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584  (1941). 
 190. See, e.g., Smoot v. Rittenhouse, 27 Wash. L. Rep. 741 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1876) 
(Supreme Court of the United States decision noting the power inherent in every court 
to establish rules for the transaction of its business); In re Hien, 166 U.S. 432, 436–37  
(1897) (stating courts of justice possess the power to make and frame reasonable rules 
not conflicting with an express statute); McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 266–67 
(1915) (finding that courts of each jurisdiction must be in a position to adopt and 
enforce their own self-preserving rules).  See also People v. Tock Chew, 6 Cal. 636 
(1856) (affirming the discretion of the trial court in instituting specific and differing 
time limits on oral argument). 
 191. Case of Hayburn, 2 U.S. 408, 410 (1792). 
33
Beety: Judicial Dismissal in the Interest of Justice
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015
662 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
this power is expressly conferred or recognized by state constitutions or stat-
utes.192 
In Iowa,193 for example, the state’s highest court prescribes all rules “of 
pleading, practice, evidence and procedure,” including rules of criminal pro-
cedure.194  The Supreme Court of Iowa submits the rule to the legislative 
council and also reports the rule to the chairpersons and ranking members of 
the senate and house judiciary committees.195  While the legislative services 
agency makes recommendations to the Supreme Court of Iowa, a rule submit-
ted will take effect sixty days after it is submitted to the legislative council, 
unless the legislative council votes to delay the effective date.196  The legisla-
 
 192. See, e.g., Cropley v. Vogeler, 2 App.D.C. 28, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1893) (stating the 
statute affirmed the court’s inherent right); De Lorme v. Pease, 19 Ga. 220, 227–28 
(1856) (stating the rule-making power of the superior courts extends to and was in-
tended to embrace all ground not covered by the statute or common law); Owens v. 
Ranstead, 22 Ill. 161, 196 (1859) (by statute the judge of the Circuit Court may estab-
lish rules of proceeding in chancery, in cases not provided for by law); Siesseger v. 
Puth, 234 N.W. 540, 451 (1931) (noting the court possesses both constitutional and 
statutory power to make rules prescribing the form and nature of court procedure). 
 193. Iowa’s relevant Rule of Criminal Procedure is Rule 2.33(1): 
 
The court, upon its own motion or the application of the prosecuting attorney, 
in the furtherance of justice, may order the dismissal of any pending criminal 
prosecution, the reasons therefor being stated in the order and entered of rec-
ord, and no such prosecution shall be discontinued or abandoned in any other 
manner. Such a dismissal is a bar to another prosecution for the same offense 
if it is a simple or serious misdemeanor; but it is not a bar if the offense 
charged be a felony or an aggravated misdemeanor. 
 
IOWA R. CIV. PROC. 2.33(1). 
 194. IOWA CODE § 602.4201 (2015) (“The supreme court may prescribe all rules 
of pleading, practice, evidence, and procedure, and the forms of process, writs, and 
notices, for all proceedings in all courts of this state, for the purposes of simplifying 
the proceedings and promoting the speedy determination of litigation upon its mer-
its.”). 
 195. Id. § 602.4202 (“The supreme court shall submit a rule or form prescribed by 
the supreme court under Section 602.4201, subsection 3, or pursuant to any other 
rulemaking authority specifically made subject to this section to the legislative coun-
cil and shall at the same time report the rule or form to the chairpersons and ranking 
members of the senate and house committees on judiciary.  The legislative services 
agency shall make recommendations to the supreme court on the proper style and 
format of rules and forms required to be submitted to the legislative council under this 
subsection.”). 
 196. Id. (“A rule or form submitted as required under subsection 1 takes effect 
sixty days after submission to the legislative council, or at a later date specified by the 
supreme court, unless the legislative council, within sixty days after submission and 
by a majority vote of its members, delays the effective date of the rule or form to a 
date as provided in subsection 3.”). 
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tive council cannot vote against the rule itself.197  This is similar to the pro-
cess for revising the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.198 
In a state like Iowa, the state’s highest court usually has broad power to 
promulgate rules, not only through judicial decisions, but also through rules 
that govern procedural matters in all state courts.199  In West Virginia, the 
highest court has the ultimate discretion to create rules governing civil and 
criminal procedure “which shall have the force and effect of law.”200  In prac-
tice, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, the only appellate court 
in West Virginia, creates a committee that analyzes the rules and suggests 
revisions; the court accepts or changes the suggested revisions and opens the 
new rules to public comment.  After the public comment period, the court 
issues the rules.201  Going through such a process, courts may create rules that 
infuse courts with the same common law power as prosecutors: to dismiss a 
case in the interest of justice. 
Another potential solution is to simply adopt Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 48(a) into court rules and to modify Rule 48(a) to include the ca-
pacity of courts to act sua sponte.202  Rule 48(a) has been interpreted to allow 
a dismissal “in the interest of justice.”203 
Notwithstanding the inherent rule-making power of courts in many ju-
risdictions, this power is expressly conferred or recognized by state constitu-
tions or statutes.204  Although this may appear self-serving, the state supreme 
 
 197. See id. 
 198. Conversation with Professor Charles DiSalvo, Chair of Committee for Re-
forming the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure (Sept. 30, 2013). 
 199. See, e.g., Schoenvogel ex rel. Schoenvogel v. Venator Group Retail, Inc., 
895 So. 2d 225, 234 (Ala. 2004); Borer v. Lewis, 91 P.3d 375, 380 (Colo. 2004); 
United Services Auto. Ass’n v. Goodman, 826 So. 2d 914, 915 (Fla. 2002); Fabre v. 
Walton, 781 N.E.2d 780, 784 (2002); USF & G Ins. Co. of Miss. v. Walls, 911 So.2d 
463, 468 (Miss. 2005); Berdella v. Pender, 821 S.W.2d 846, 849–50 (Mo. 1991); 
State v. Davis, 141 S.W.3d 600, 628 (Tenn. 2004); State v. Arbaugh, 595 S.E.2d 289, 
290 (Wa. Va. 2004); Terex Corp. v. Hough, 50 P.3d 317, 322 (Wyo. 2002). 
 200. W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 3. 
 201. Conversation with Professor Charles DiSalvo, Chair of Comm. for Revising 
the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure (Sept. 30, 2013). 
 202. FED. R. CRIM. P. 48 (“(a) By the Government. The government may, with 
leave of court, dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint. The government 
may not dismiss the prosecution during trial without the defendant’s consent.  (b) By 
the Court. The court may dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint if unnec-
essary delay occurs in: (1) presenting a charge to a grand jury; (2) filing an infor-
mation against a defendant; or (3) bringing a defendant to trial.”). 
 203. See Sheila Kles, Criminal Procedure II: How Much Further is the Further-
ance of Justice?  1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 413, 415–16 (1991) (citing support for 
interpretation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a) with “in the interest of 
justice” as a basis for dismissal). 
 204. See, e.g., Cropley v. Vogeler, 2 App.D.C. 28, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1893) (stating the 
statute affirmed the court’s inherent right); De Lorme v. Pease, 19 Ga. 220, 227–28 
(1856) (stating the rule-making power of the superior courts extends to and was in-
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court has the prerogative to consider and promulgate such rules and stand-
ards.  By virtue of this process, courts may create rules that instill themselves 
with the same common law power as prosecutors: to dismiss a case in the 
interest of justice. 
CONCLUSION 
The exile imposed on citizens with a felony conviction in our time in 
history, first in prison and then on the outskirts of society, may eventually be 
seen like the cases of Johnson v. McIntosh, Dred Scott, and Korematsu. This 
exile may define what the Constitution – and what our country – is not. 
Our current system arguably creates a second class of citizens, physical-
ly separated for sanctioned punishment and then civilly separated in silent 
shadowed punishment.  Judicial capacity to dismiss cases provides an oppor-
tunity for change: for pivoting accountability and responsibility from prose-
cutors to the judiciary.  This Article proposes that courts reclaim the capacity 
to dismiss cases in the interest of justice.  For those state courts without this 
capacity, this Article suggests creating state rules of criminal procedure that 
allow trial courts to make such a decision.  Courts can, as Abraham Lincoln 
described it, fulfill “[t]he legitimate object of government [] to do for a com-
munity of people, whatever they need to have done, but can not [sic] do, at 
all, or can not [sic], so well do, for themselves—in their separate, and indi-
vidual capacities.”205 
One of the final actions President Lincoln took on the day of his assassi-
nation was to pardon a deserter soldier named Patrick Murphy.206  Taking 
responsibility and responding to the justice of the situation provides an open-
ing for society to heal.  After thirty years of the War on Drugs, judicial action 




tended to embrace all ground not covered by the statute or common law); Owens v. 
Ranstead, 22 Ill. 161, 196 (1859) (by statute the judge of the Circuit Court may estab-
lish rules of proceeding in chancery, in cases not provided for by law); Siesseger v. 
Puth, 234 N.W. 540, 451 (1931) (noting the court possesses both constitutional and 
statutory power to make rules prescribing the form and nature of court procedure). 
 205. LINCOLN, supra note 4. 
 206. JOSHUA WOLF SHENK, LINCOLN’S MELANCHOLY: HOW DEPRESSION 
CHALLENGED A PRESIDENT AND FUELED HIS GREATNESS 210 (2005). 
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